The OHE model takes into account the value to society of new antibiotics as well as the risks and rewards for payers and the entities developing the new drugs.
A new model aimed at encouraging the development of new antibiotics was presented recently by OHE’s Chris Hoyle, who collaborated with Adrian Towse and Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz in designing the model.
A new model aimed at encouraging the development of new antibiotics was presented[1] recently by OHE’s Chris Hoyle, who collaborated with Adrian Towse and Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz in designing the model.
Antimicrobial resistance to existing antibiotics is an increasingly serious global health issue that extends to a number of diseases. Earlier OHE research defined the parameters of policy options, which must achieve two objectives: (1) encourage the development of new antibiotics to treat resistant microbes and (2) discourage the overuse that produces resistance.
Chris’s presentation, below, summarises the OHE model, which takes into account the value to society of new antibiotics as well as the risks and rewards for payers and the entities developing the new drugs. It concludes that traditional incentives for R&D/market exclusivity are likely to be insufficient to spur development, and that uncertainty and risk are too great for price alone to provide sufficient incentive. The most effective solution couples an advance market commitment, at national or supranational level, with careful local pricing.
OHE’s previous work on this issue has included thorough analyses of the policy issues worldwide as well as policy options specifically for use in discussion in the EU. For blog posts about this research, please click here.
[1] Hoyle, C., 2014
Economic incentive for new antibiotics. Presentation at Superbugs & Superdrugs – A Focus on Antibacterials, London, 5-6 March.
